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  A growing share of government expenditures, in the United States and in other developed 
countries, is devoted to transfer programs benefiting the elderly.  These programs involve 
substantial and very long-term commitments to members of the current labor force.  Combined 
with aging populations, this spending pattern has led to serious questions about the viability of 
current fiscal policy, both in the United States and in other developed countries (e.g., Auerbach 
et al 1999).  But how and when to deal with these apparent fiscal imbalances is very difficult to 
ascertain, even if one￿s social objectives are clearly specified.  With considerable uncertainty 
about future mortality, productivity and other factors affecting fiscal balance, the plausible range 
of outcomes under current policy is enormous (e.g., Lee and Tuljapurkar 2001).  The political 
difficulty of changing such well-established programs imparts a further brake to the policy 
reform process.   Policy-makers shy away from touching the ￿third rail￿ of politics, as the U.S. 
social security system has been called in graphic commemoration of its popularity. 
  This paper investigates the nature of optimal fiscal policy, in an environment endowed 
with many of the important characteristics of the current fiscal climate.  Using an infinite 
horizon, overlapping-generations model, we estimate the optimal levels of taxes, transfers and 
debt when there is population uncertainty and restrictions on the government￿s ability to change 
policy.  We also consider how optimal policy is influenced by household attitudes toward risk, 
and how the prospect of resolving uncertainty may affect actions today.  This last point, in 
particular, is of interest, because it addresses the point one frequently hears in the policy debate, 
that with such enormous uncertainty about future circumstances, it is better to wait until more 
information is available.  Clearly, the desirability of waiting depends on whether the future 
brings a resolution of uncertainty or simply new shocks to replace the old.   2
This paper builds on our previous work on the subject (Auerbach and Hassett 2001).  In 
that paper, we provided a theoretical analysis of optimal fiscal policy in an overlapping-
generations model with several sources of uncertainty, and then provided simulations of the 
model, with and without restrictions on government policy, to estimate the effects of imposing 
these constraints.  The current paper extends our previous analysis in a number of important 
ways.  Most fundamentally, using an alternative simulation technique, we are now able to derive 
optimal government policies in an infinite horizon setting, rather than in the short-horizon case to 
which the previous paper￿s simulations were limited.  This change, in turn, means that we are 
now able to examine the stochastic steady states under different policy rules, to trace out not only 
the impact effects of government policies, but also the long-run effects.  In addition, we consider 
variations in preferences and in the environment of uncertainty.  We estimate the sensitivity of 
optimal policy to the degree of household risk aversion, and replace the assumption of stationary 
shocks to life expectancy with an ARCH model in which the current environment can either be 
more or less uncertain than the environment expected for the future. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section sets up the basic 
model, and reviews the results of the previous literature.  Section 3 describes the simulation 
techniques we use to solve for the government￿s value function and optimal policy in different 
environments, based on the use of neural networks.  Section 4 presents our basic results for 
optimal policy and considers the impact of political constraints, while Section 5 considers the 
impact of varying household risk aversion, and Section 6 the stochastic process for life 
expectancy.  Section 7 offers some concluding comments and suggestions for future research. 
   3
2. Government Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model 
A. The Basic Setup 
  Throughout the paper, we analyze policy design using a two-period overlapping-
generations model with no bequests, heterogeneity within each generation, or capital market 
imperfections.  There is no growth in population per generation or productivity, and one source 
of uncertainty in the economy, individual life span.
1  Individuals supply a unit of fixed labor 
when young (normalized to 1 unit per generation) and are retired when old, and make one 
decision based on preferences, how much to save for retirement consumption and how much to 
spend on consumption when young.  A generation￿s life span is unknown when it makes its 
saving decision, but is revealed before it consumes in old age, so that there are no accidental 
bequests. The government can increase welfare because the market does not offer an asset that 
insures the current young against the possibility that they will have an unexpectedly long 
lifespan.  The old, however, know their actual lifespan, so they do not have to purchase an 
annuity to insure against long lifetimes.  Since precautionary saving by the young is a function of 
uncertainty concerning lifetime, our framework is related to that of Yaari (1965) and Sheshinski 
and Weiss (1981).  
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1 Productivity shocks are also important in determining optimal fiscal policy, and their inclusion would be a useful 
extension of the current approach.  We have not included them here because of the considerable complexity they 
would add to the simulation problem.  The complication arises because, with productivity shocks, private assets are 
risky and it is necessary to determine portfolio equilibrium and the premium on risky assets relative to safe assets.  
With only life-span uncertainty, all assets are perfect substitutes, so it is unnecessary to solve for the risk-premium 
or portfolio decisions.   4
From (1), the competitive wage rate and interest rate at t are: 
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We initially also assume that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, 
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where Ut is the expected utility of the generation born in period t, C1t (C2t) is the consumption of 
the younger (older) generation in period t, and βt is the length of second-period life for the older 
generation in period t.  The form of second period utility is based on the notion that the period is 
really divided into β sub-periods, each with equal weight and consumption. 
  Government policy at date t is specified by the level of safe government debt at that date, 
Bt, and taxes on the young and old generations, T1t and T2t.  Together, these three variables 
determine the transition equation for government debt: 
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There are various possible interpretations of the terms T1t and T2t.  One may think of them as 
representing the tax and benefit components, respectively, of a public pension scheme.  
However, for convenience, we assume that the second-period tax, T2t, is imposed as a 
proportional tax on second-period capital income.  Although this appears to impose a distortion, 
the government￿s optimal policy will turn out to be one that eschews distortionary taxation.
2 
                                                 
2 That is, in the model in which policy is unconstrained, the government is able to achieve the same allocation as it 
would by directly choosing the levels of consumption for the old and the young.  See Auerbach and Hassett (2001) 
for further discussion.   5

















The expression for second-period consumption is: 
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where the last substitution follows from (4).   With use made of (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6), the 
capital transition equation is: 
 






































  Finally, we assume that life span evolves according to the first-order autoregressive 
process,  
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where, initially, the random term ε is assumed to be i.i.d. over time.  In the simulations presented 
below, we assume that ε has a uniform distribution. 
  The preceding equations provide a complete solution for the economy￿s evolution at each 
date t.     6
B. Optimal Policy without Constraints 
  We are now in a position to maximize social welfare through the choice of {T1t, T2t, Bt+1} 
at date t, subject to expectations at date t.  We assume an additively separable social welfare 
function with weight ωt assigned to generation t.  Our objective, therefore, is to maximize
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subject to three state variables, the values debt, Bt, capital, Kt, and life expectancy, βt, at date t.  







, is constant over 
time, and denote this pure discount rate as r*.  Thus, we may rewrite (9) as: 
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where Vt =Wt /ωt-1  is the government￿s objective at date t, normalized by the discount factor it 
applies to that date￿s old generation. 
  In our earlier paper, we discussed the characteristics of the optimal solution to this 
problem and derived some results based on a linearization of the model around its stochastic 
steady state.  While we will not try to summarize all these results, a couple of them are worth 
noting. 
  First, the government￿s optimal policy calls for the marginal utility of first-period 
consumption to follow a random walk, with drift of (1+r*)/(1+rt+1) ≈ r*- rt+1, 
 
                                                 




























Note that expected growth of consumption itself depends on the level of uncertainty, because of 
the convexity of the function U1(C1)  = 1/C1.  A mean-preserving spread in next period￿s 
consumption will increase expected marginal utility, because the decrease in marginal utility 
associated with positive deviations of consumption from its mean will be more than offset by the 
increase in marginal utility associated with negative consumption deviations.  The uncertainty of 
future consumption increases its value and makes it optimal for the household to increase mean 
expected consumption and hence the consumption growth rate.  As first noted by Leland (1968), 
this increase in precautionary saving in response to uncertainty is implied by the convexity of the 
marginal utility of consumption or, equivalently, a positive third derivative of the utility function.  
Any utility function with the desirable property of constant or decreasing absolute risk 
aversion￿including the constant relative risk aversion class considered below, of which 
logarithmic utility is a special case￿satisfies this property.  Indeed, the greater the fluctuations 
in consumption, the greater this precautionary saving should be. 
  Second, a positive shock to life span should reduce current capital accumulation.  With 
more consumption needed in the near term, less capital should be accumulated. This result may 
seem counterintuitive, if one thinks of longer life span as making individuals better off and more 
able to make transfers to other generations.  But the key here is the impact on the marginal value 
of consumption; with longer life span, a generation must spread its resources over a longer 
period.  Also, the more durable this positive shock, the smaller the reduction in capital 
accumulation ￿ and the greater the decline in consumption ￿ that should occur.  This is because 
future generations are expected to be less able to provide resources for current ones.    8
C. Limits on Policy Changes 
  Thus far, we have considered government policy when there is sufficient instrument 
flexibility for the government to control consumption directly.  In a more realistic setting, this is 
unlikely to be the case. 
  One complication that may arise is that it may not be possible to change government￿s 
instruments in every period.  This may reflect political difficulties, or implicitly the large fixed 
costs associated with major policy changes.  To be concrete, let us suppose that the tax rates T1 
and T2 cannot be changed in successive periods.  Given that each period in an overlapping 
generations model corresponds to roughly 30 years, this restriction corresponds to the notion that 
major changes in, say, the Social Security or Medicare system may be possible only once every 
few decades.  In the U.S. currently, for example, it has been almost 20 years since the Greenspan 
commission￿s recommendations lead to an overhaul of the Social Security system, despite the 
fact that the long run balance of the system has been a clear issue for at least a decade. 
  With this restriction on frequent changes, the government￿s problem now can be viewed 
as depending on an indicator variable dt, which equals 0 if T1t-1 = T1t-2 and T2t-1 = T2t-2 and 1 




t V ) be the government￿s normalized objective function in period t if dt = 
0 (1), we may express these functions as: 
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where  it C  is the value of Cit chosen by the household of age i when {T1t, T2t} equals {T1t-1, T2t-1}.  
The government￿s optimization problem at date t thus consists of maximizing 
0
t V  if it did not 
change taxes in the previous period, subject to five state variables, the original set {Bt, Kt, βt} 
plus lagged taxes, {T1t-1, T2t-1}. 
  Despite the apparent simplicity of this objective, the presence of two value functions and 
five state variables makes even numerical solution challenging.  Using the approach of backward 
induction, starting from an assumed terminal period, we were able in our previous paper to arrive 
at solutions only for a four-period horizon, because of the growing dimensionality of the 
optimization problem.   
3. Simulation Methodology 
  In this paper, we take a different approach to solving for the government￿s optimal 
policy.  Consider first the case in which the government is unconstrained in its choice of T1t and 
T2t, regardless of its policy decisions the previous period.  By the stationarity of the inifinite-
horizon problem, the value function will depend only on the state variables at date t, and not the 
date itself.  That is, we can express Bellman￿s equation corresponding to the optimization 
problem as: 
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where we use expressions (2) and (4)-(8) to express the variables on the right-hand side of (12) 
in terms of the state variables at date t and the instruments T1t and T2t.   10
  To avoid the ￿curse of dimensionality,￿ we attempt to solve (12) directly for the 
stationary value function, rather than by converging to this function through backward induction.  
That is, we start with an initial guess of the function V(•), say  ) ( ~ ⋅ V , defined over a grid of values 
for the vector of state variables, and calculate a new guess of the function, say  ) (⋅ V , using 
equation (12), 
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and iterate on this expression until the function converges, i.e.,  ) ( ~ ) ( ⋅ ≡ ⋅ V V .  When this occurs, 
we have solved for the value function V(•).  Because we iterate over the same value function over 
and over, this problem has the same dimensionality as that of the two-period finite horizon case, 
making this aspect of the problem much simpler than under the backward-induction approach.  
But the trade-off is that we must start with a guess of the value function, and must use a method 
of approximation that is flexible enough to represent a potentially very complicated function of 
unknown shape. 
  The problem of approximating an unknown function is even more challenging for the 
case in which government is constrained not to move every period, for then the value function V
0 
is an upper envelope of two functions, based on this period￿s V
1 and next period￿s V
0.  Bellman￿s 
equations corresponding to (11a) and (11b) are: 
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where Xt =  ) , , , , ( 1 2 1 1 − − t t t t t T T B K β .  Substituting the expressions for V
1(Xt) and V
1(Xt+1) from (14b) 
into that for V
0(Xt) in (14a) and applying the law of iterated expectations yields an expression in 
the single value function V
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As in the simpler, unconstrained case, we may iterate on the value function in (15) by replacing 
each of the value functions on the right-hand side of the equation with an initial guess  ) ( ~0 ⋅ V  and 
solving for a new function  ) (
0 ⋅ V  on the left-hand side.  Once convergence is reached, we can 
immediately solve for the function V
1(•) by plugging the solved equation for V
0(•) into the right-
hand side of (14b).  
  Following the suggestion in Judd (1998), we use neural networks to approximate the 
value function for each iteration of the process just described.  A neural network approximates 
functions using a succession of linear and nonlinear transformations of the vector of state 
variables, the parameters of these transformations being updated with each iteration in order to 
approximate the newly obtained estimate of the value function,  ) (⋅ V  or  ) (
0 ⋅ V .  The Appendix 
provides further details of the simulation methodology.
4 
                                                 
4 We experimented with alternative solution algorithms including the use of Chebyshev polynomials, but found that 
the neural network approach was more successful in approximating the value function for the more complicated 
problem with government policy constraints.   12
4. Basic Results 
  Table 1 presents the simulation results for optimal policy under both assumptions about 
government policy constraints, and for a variety of initial values of life expectancy, β, and the 
persistence of shocks, as represented by the autoregressive term, ρ.  For all simulations in this 
table, the random term ε is assumed to be drawn from a distribution that is uniform over the 
interval [-0.1, 0.1], and the government￿s pure rate of time preference, r*, equals 2.
5  The initial 
stock of capital is set equal to its steady state value in the absence of shocks, and the initial stock 
of debt is set to zero.
6 
Let us consider first the results for the unconstrained model.  In this case, it can be shown 
(see Auerbach and Hassett 2001) that the government￿s decision simplifies to a two-step 
problem: it allocates consumption to each generation in a given period to equal C2/C1 = (1+r
*)β 
(which equals 3β for our assumption that r
* = 2
7), and then chooses the capital stock to spread 
resources over time, consistent with its Euler equation relating the marginal utilities of 
successive young generations. 
The unconstrained results are also consistent with the prediction regarding the impact of 
ρ on the response of consumption to a shock to current life span, β.  Recall that as the shock to β 
is expected to be more permanent (ρ is large), we can less afford an increase in the current 
consumption of the elderly.  Thus, consumption of the elderly should increase less, and saving 
                                                 
5 Remember that each period in this life-cycle model represents a generation of perhaps 30 years, so a discount 
factor of 2 corresponds to a compounded annual discount factor of around 3.7 percent. 
6 The simulations in this table are based on the same parameterizations as those in Table 1 of Auerbach and Hassett 
(2001).  Although the patterns of the results are reasonably similar when ρ=0.1, they are less so when ρ=0.9, 
suggesting that the approximation error involved in using a finite horizon is more significant when shocks are 
persistent. 
7 That this relationship does not hold exactly in each simulation reflects rounding and slight interpolation error.   13
should be higher, when ρ is high.  Indeed, this is quite evident when we compare the changes in 
C2 as β increases for ρ = .1 and ρ = .9. 
  Another result worth noting is that, as the level of uncertainty increases, so does optimal 
saving.  For a starting value of β =1, there is no expected trend in life span.  The larger ρ is, 
however, the more persistence is expected for positive or negative life-span shocks, and hence 
these shocks have more important effects.  The increased risk at β = 1 associated with an 
increase in ρ from 0.1 to 0.9 raises the optimal level of Kt+1.  Indeed, for ρ = 0.9, the optimal 
capital stock is higher in all cases than in the deterministic steady-state value.  Thus, with 
sufficient uncertainty, it is optimal to accumulate additional capital, even if current needs are 
unusually high (i.e., β > 1). 
  The simulations for the constrained model show the optimal policy choices, if the 
government is able to act and if it is optimal to do so.  Whether moving is optimal, in turn, will 
depend on the lagged values of T1 and T2. 
As one would expect, anticipating a lack of flexibility leads the government to sacrifice 
current consumption to provide for the future.  In all cases, both C1 and C2 are lower than in the 
corresponding unconstrained specification.  In percentage terms, the reduction in C1 is larger 
than that in C2.  Intuitively, this reflects the fact that the young may be expected to ￿recover￿ part 
of the government￿s extra precautionary saving when they are old.  Also, the higher is current 
life span, β, the greater is amount of added precautionary saving.  The intuition for this is that, 
when the current value of β is high, future generations are, in general, expected to be worse off ￿ 
they are also expected to have a high β, and hence less consumption per unit time for a given 
level of resources.  With their higher associated marginal utility of consumption, the welfare cost 
of having the ￿wrong￿ fiscal policy in place when the government cannot move will be greater.    14
This leads the government to exact a greater sacrifice from current generations, particularly the 
young. 
In Figures 1 and 2, we present estimates of the range of inaction in the policy-constrained 
version of the model, for the cases of β = 1 and ρ = 0.9 and 0.1, respectively.  In each figure, the 
star represents the optimal value of the pair {T1, T2}, corresponding to the values in bold in Table 
1.  These values of the lagged tax rates would yield the highest value of the current value 
function.  As the lagged tax rates move away from this point, it is more and more costly for the 
government to maintain its option to move next period.  When the boundary of the inaction range 
is passed, it becomes optimal for the government to change policy in the current period, 
extinguishing the option to move in the next period. 
There are a number of interesting patterns in these two figures.  First, the area of the 
inaction range is substantially bigger for ρ = .9 than for ρ = .1.  This difference suggests that 
there is much greater value in waiting to adjust policy if next period￿s information is more 
￿permanent.￿  Another interesting pattern in these results is that the optimal values of T1 and T2 
each lie much closer to the upper boundary of their respective inaction ranges than to the lower 
boundary.  This is especially true for ρ = 0.1.  We may infer from this that suboptimal current 
tax rates are more costly if they are too high than if they are too low.  
The intuition for this finding is as follows, and depicted in Figure 3.  Mistakes in either 
direction have a roughly symmetric impact on the welfare of future generations; because these 
deviations in resources from the optimal policy are spread over a large number of generations, 
the deviation for any one generation is very small and hence valued at an approximately constant 
marginal utility for movements in either direction.  This is depicted by the dashed horizontal line 
in Figure 3, characterizing the valuation by future generations of movements away from the   15
optimal distribution of resources at point a
*.   For current generations, however, the resource 
fluctuations from optimal policy are large, so that the marginal utility applicable to added 
resources will be lower than the marginal utility applicable to resources taken away, as depicted 
by the downward sloping line in Figure 3.  There is a net social cost of moving in either direction 
from point a
*, but, for equal movements in either direction (to point al or point ah) the cost of 
being too generous to current generations￿the area H in the figure￿is smaller than the cost of 
being too harsh￿point L in the figure￿as long as the marginal valuation curve of current 
generations in convex.  This convexity condition on marginal utility, i.e., that the utility 
function￿s third derivative is positive, is precisely the same condition discussed above that causes 
uncertainty to increase precautionary saving.  Hence, a factor that tends to increase saving in the 
unconstrained case and, presumably, in the constrained case as well, also works in the opposite 
direction in the constrained case, causing the government to be more likely to cut taxes than to 
raise them when current policy is not optimal. 
Thus, when taking action, the government is likely to engage in more precautionary 
saving in the constrained model, but the timing of its actions tend to favor less saving.  Taking 
into account both periods of action and periods of inaction, taxes could be higher or lower in the 
constrained world than in the unconstrained world.  We address this question below, but consider 
first the impact of the results presented thus far of the government￿s discount rate. 
Table 2, and Figures 4 and 5, provide simulations and inaction ranges comparable to 
those in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2, but for a government discount rate of r* = 1 instead of r* = 
2.  Although the patterns are generally similar to those already discussed, there are some 
interesting and intuitive differences.  Note, for example, what happens to capital accumulation in 
the constrained case for ρ = 0.9, as β rises.  Previously, we found that capital accumulation   16
should fall, because the current elderly need more resources.  The high value of ρ mitigates this, 
because the elderly in the near future will also need more resources.  Here, though, the 
government actually chooses to accumulate more when β is high.  The reason is that β could go 
even higher, and a government constrained not to move in the future, with a low discount rate, 
perceives the need to provide for this eventuality. 
Another effect of the lower discount rate is the expansion of the government￿s inaction 
range.  This is most evident when the range is large to begin with, for the case of ρ = 0.9 (Figure 
4 versus Figure 1).  Imbued with a greater concern for future generations, the government values 
the option to move in the future more highly. 
We now return to the question raised earlier, whether the imposition of policy constraints 
reduces saving and capital accumulation in the long run.  As discussed, there are offsetting 
factors, as government engages in more precautionary saving when it changes policy, but is more 
likely to change policy when saving is too high, rather than too low.  Figures 6 and 7 provide 
comparisons of steady-state capital stock distributions for constrained and unconstrained policy 
action, for the case of persistent life-span shocks (ρ = 0.9).  Figure 6 is for the case of a high 
government discount rate (r* =2), corresponding to Figure 1 and the left side of Table 1.  Figure 
7 is for the case of a low discount rate (r* = 1), corresponding to Figure 4 and the left side of 
Table 2.  In each of the new figures, the distribution of the capital stock is tighter when there are 
no policy constraints, as one would expect.  When r* = 1, the capital stock distribution has a 
higher mean as well, reflecting the precautionary saving motive.  But, when r* = 2, the 
asymmetry of the inaction range dominates, and the capital stock is actually lower, on average, 
with constraints on government action.   17
5. The Impact of Risk Aversion 
  Thus far, we have considered variations in initial conditions, government constraints and 
the environment of uncertainty, but not in household preferences and, by extension, the risk 
aversion implicit in government policy making.  Clearly, risk aversion is an important element of 
the problem, so it is useful to see how variations in risk aversion affect optimal government 
policy.  In place of the Cobb-Douglas preferences assumed thus far, we now consider the general 
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with coefficient of risk aversion γ.  When γ  = 1, preferences are Cobb-Douglas. 
  For general CES preferences, the first-order condition for first-period consumption 
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1 +  is the after-tax rate of return in period t+1.  When γ =1, xt+1 reduces to Etβt+1 and (5′) 
reduces to (5).  Otherwise, the distribution of 
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1 +  with r* in (17).  The approximation error involved in doing so is likely to be   18
small, given the fairly tight distribution for the capital stock in the simulations we are 
considering, with r*=2 and ρ=0.9 and government unconstrained (see Figure 5). 
  Table 3 presents simulations for three different values of the degree of risk aversion, γ, 
1.1, 3.0 and 5.0
8, and two values for the interval of the uniform distribution.  The interval used 
above, [-0.1, 0.1], has length 0.2.  To consider the effects of risk and risk aversion, we utilize two 
extreme values for the interval length, 0.1 and 1.1, corresponding to the uniform distributions  
[-.05, 0.05] and [-0.55, 0.55]. 
  As the table shows, the impact of risk on behavior is very small for a moderate degree of 
risk aversion.  When γ = 1.1, there is a slight decline in the optimal level of C2 caused by 
increased risk, and a decline in the optimal level of C1 so small that it is not perceptible to the 
third decimal place.  Thus, although the point emphasized above about the pure impact of risk on 
precautionary saving is true, it is not particularly significant here, compared to the impact, say, of 
the government￿s inability to change policy.  The importance of risk becomes more important as 
the degree of risk aversion grows.  For the empirically large (but not implausible) risk aversion 
coefficient of 5, first- and second-period consumption levels are noticeably lower for the higher-
risk simulation.  This is consistent with the fact that, as risk-aversion grows, so (for the CRRA 
utility function) does the strength of the precautionary saving motive, as measured by the degree 
of ￿prudence￿ (Kimball 1990).
9 
                                                 
8 We use γ =1.1 instead of 1.0 to simplify the programming, which would require additional statements to handle 
exact Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
9 Kimball defines ￿prudence￿ as minus the ratio of the third utility derivative to the second utility derivative and 
shows that the precautionary saving motive increases with this measure, which equals (1+γ)/C for risk-aversion 
coefficient γ.  Thus, for a given value of consumption, prudence increases with risk aversion.   19
6. Why Wait? Changes in the Degree of Uncertainty 
  Up until this point, we have analyzed the impact on optimal policy of the level of 
uncertainty, but the distribution of lifetime uncertainty has been fixed for each simulation. This 
assumption ignores a second possible source of gain to policy delay: the possibility that the 
government can learn more about the underlying parameters over time.  As many have 
documented, programs like Social Security and Medicare appear unsustainable and in need of 
substantial change.  A commonly heard argument, though, is that for programs like these that are 
subject to enormous uncertainty, it is impossible and hence unwise to take any significant action 
immediately, when so little is known.  While this argument may ring true, there is little in the 
analysis thus far to support it.  Indeed, there are two factors working in precisely the opposite 
direction.  First, as just discussed, risk aversion should lead to precautionary saving, and more 
risk should lead to more saving.  Second, to the extent that government may face limits on its 
ability to act, any action it takes should involve even more stringent policy measures.  It is true, 
as we have seen, that constraints on policy also leave room for ranges of inaction when 
circumstances are not far enough away from optimal, and that the inaction range expands with 
uncertainty.  But is there more to the story than this? 
  One possibility involves the distinction between risk and uncertainty that goes back to 
Knight (1921) and has been considered anew in the recent literature (see, e.g., Schmeidler 
(1989)) The argument may be that the parameters of  the distributions of the stochastic terms are 
unknown, but that the government is in the process of learning them.  Without departing from the 
standard paradigm for analyzing optimal behavior under uncertainty, though, one may make 
sense of the argument for waiting if a resolution of the existing uncertainty may be expected.  
That is, it makes little sense to wait for today￿s uncertainty to be resolved, if more is on the way   20
tomorrow.  But if today￿s uncertainty is greater than that anticipated for the future, waiting might 
make sense. 
  To some extent, an ARCH process that allows the parameters of the mortality distribution 
to evolve over time in a predictable way parametrically characterizes such a situation, but in an 
admittedly incomplete manner since it abstracts from the learning process and occurs within a 
well defined probability space.   To make this intuition concrete, we adapt the model considered 
thus far, to allow changes in the degree of life-span uncertainty over time.  We continue to 
assume that life span is stochastic, and described by the first-order autoregressive process in (8).  
But now, instead of assuming that the random terms εt are i.i.d., we assume that they are 
determined by an ARCH(1) process, in which the variance of the distribution itself varies over 
time around some long-run value. 
Let νt be a random draw from the uniform [-0.5, 0.5] distribution at date t, and let m be 
the term that multiplies this to determine the actual error term εt and the range of the 
corresponding uniform distribution.  For example, for the range equal to 1.1 used in Table 3, m ≡ 
1.1.  Now,   suppose that m is time varying, with εt = mt-1νt.










ν σ  is the (constant) variance of the innovation ν.  In this expression, the unconditional 
expectation of 
2
t m  is 
2 m , and the expectation conditional on 
2
1 − t m  is 
2
1
2 ) 1 ( − + − t m m α α .  Thus, 
2
t m  follows a first-order AR process.  For α = 0, the process reduces to the one previously 
                                                 
10 We choose the timing of m in this way because it is known as of the end of period t-1, while νt is not.   21
considered, with m ≡ m .  The larger α is, the more persistence there is in the impact of shocks to 
the variance itself.  Given that  ∫− =
5 .
5 .
2 2 ν ν σν d   =   ) 5 . 5 (.
3 3
3
1 +  =  12
1 , equation (18) becomes: 
 
(19)    
2 2
1
2 2 12 ) 1 ( t t t m m m ν α α − + − =   
 
Using the ARCH specification, we can contrast two situations in which current conditions are the 
same.  In the first, the variance is mt-1, and expected to stay at this value.  In another, the current 
variance is mt-1, but m follows an ARCH(1) process and is expected to fall in the future, because 
mt-1 > m .  In this case, mt-1 is an additional state variable of the government￿s optimization 
problem. 
  Table 4 provides simulations that allow us to measure the impact of this distinction.  The 
first three columns repeat the last three from Table 3, with r* = 2, β =1, ρ = 0.9, and m≡ 1.1.  
The next three columns present simulations for the same current values of these parameters, but 
with m determined by an ARCH(1) process with α = 0.2.  In all simulations, the capital stock is 
increased by policy from its initial level, so the situation corresponds to one in which ￿fiscal 
discipline￿ is needed.  The results indicate that the intuition provided above holds, but only for a 
sufficiently risk-averse population. 
When γ = 5, the prospect of reduced future variance lowers the perceived need for 
precautionary saving.  Consumption by both young and old is higher than under the constant-
variance assumption, and capital accumulation is substantially lower.  This effect, however, is 
substantially weaker for the moderate degree of risk aversion, γ = 3.  For γ = 1.1, the effect is 
actually reversed.  Although the model is sufficiently complicated that no simple intuition seems 
to apply, we conjecture that this reversal has something to do with a second aspect of the ARCH   22
process.  While m is expected to fall in the long run, it also varies with actual shocks in the short 
run.  In particular, if there is an unexpected increase in life span ￿ which is bad news for fiscal 
policy ￿ this will also induce an increase in m.  Thus, negative fiscal shocks will be associated 
with increased uncertainty, and this positive relationship may lead to more precautionary saving, 
offsetting the effect of the long-run decline in m that is anticipated.  In summary, unless the 
resolution of uncertainty is itself certain, its possibility does not necessarily dictate delay in 
remedial fiscal actions. 
7. Conclusions 
  Using numerical simulations, we have considered the nature of optimal long-run fiscal 
policy in a variety of environments.  Although it may be helpful to think of these results as 
relating specifically to optimal Social Security policy, the model is more general and abstracts 
from the specific institutions of Social Security.
11 
  Our results indicate that limits on the ability of government to readily adjust policy exert 
a significant impact on the nature of optimal policy.  These limits lead to more precautionary 
saving when policy changes, but also to an asymmetry in policy responsiveness that favors 
current generations.  Thus, in the long run, policy constraints can contribute either to more 
saving or less, and make the distribution of the long-run capital stock much wider.  We also find 
that the resolution of uncertainty may lead to circumstances where it is optimal to ￿wait and see,￿ 
but that powerful precautionary motives work in the opposite direction. 
  
                                                 
11 For a good recent analysis of optimal Social Security policy with respect to risk-sharing in a model that 
incorporates many of Social Security￿s institutional characteristics, see Bohn (2001).  Bohn￿s analysis relates most 
closely to that of our unconstrained model, which we explored more fully in Auerbach and Hassett (2001).   23
Appendix: Neural Networks 
Figure 8 provides a schematic representation of the neural network we use here, for the 
simple unconstrained problem in which there are three state variables, the capital stock, K, the 
level of debt, B, and life span, β. 
The neural network approximates a function using a sequence of linear and nonlinear 
transformations of the state variables.  In the first stage of each round, a pre-specified number, 
say m, of linear combinations of the state variables are constructed, using the weights w11•••w3m.
12  
Each linear combination corresponds to a ￿node￿ of the first ￿hidden￿ layer of the neural 
network, and is passed through a nonlinear transformation, denoted f in Figure 8.  If there is just 
one hidden layer, then the resulting scalars, x1￿xm, are aggregated using linear weights ui to 
form an approximation of the value function evaluated at the particular inputs, V(β, K, B).  If 
there is a second hidden layer, as depicted in Figure 8, then there is an additional step before this 
final aggregation, in which the initial process is repeated; if there are n nodes in the second 
hidden layer, we form n linear combinations of the outputs of the first hidden layer, x1￿xm, and 
pass these linear combinations through another nonlinear transformation, denoted g in Figure 8.  
The function depicted in the figure is: 
 
(A1)   ∑∑∑





















) , , ( ￿ β  
 
where {z1, z2 ,z3} = {β, K, B}.  The unknown parameters of this function, the vectors u, v, and w, 
are chosen to minimize the sum of squared residuals, ()
2
) , , ( ) , , ( ￿ B K V B K V β β − , over the points 
in the state variable grid. 
                                                 
12 The linear transformations also include a constant.   24
The flexibility of the neural network increases with the number of hidden layers and the 
number of nodes in each layer, but so does computational time.  Also with too many nodes 
and/or layers than are necessary for a close approximation, we lose degrees of freedom and may 
hamper our ability to forecast the function for points not on the grid.  Thus, we experiment with 
different specifications, adding layers or nodes until sufficient flexibility is achieved, and 
experimenting with different nonlinear transformations as well.  For the unconstrained model 
and Cobb-Douglas preferences, we used one hidden layer and six nodes.  For the unconstrained 
model with CES preferences, and for the ARCH model, we used one hidden layer and 10 nodes.  
For the most complex simulations, those based on the constrained model, we added a second 
hidden layer, with 16 nodes in the first layer and seven nodes in the second layer.  For each 
specification, we used the hyperbolic tangent sigmoid transfer function 
 








for the first hidden layer.  For the second hidden layer in the constrained simulations, we used 







All simulations were carried out in MATLAB.  25
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Table 1.  Optimal Policy Rules 
(r* = 2) 
 
Unconstrained 
                    
ρ    0.9    0.9  0.9   0.1  0.1   0.1
β    0.7    1.0  1.3   0.7  1.0   1.3
                    
V    -2.096    -2.534  -2.939   -2.203  -2.533   -2.833
C1    0.157    0.124  0.100   0.154  0.124   0.104
C2    0.332    0.368  0.393   0.322  0.373   0.403
Kt+1    0.065    0.064  0.062   0.079  0.059   0.048
T1    0.099    0.124  0.144   0.069  0.124   0.160
T2    -0.149    -0.184  -0.209   -0.138  -0.189   -0.219
Bt+1    0.050    0.060  0.065   0.070  0.065   0.060
                    
                    
Constrained 
                    
ρ    0.9    0.9  0.9   0.1  0.1   0.1
β    0.7    1.0  1.3   0.7  1.0   1.3
                    
V    -2.097    -2.549  -2.968   -2.216  -2.550   -2.858
C1    0.139    0.108  0.084   0.132  0.105   0.087
C2    0.325    0.357  0.382   0.319  0.363   0.389
Kt+1    0.090    0.090  0.089   0.104  0.087   0.079
T1   0.130   0.156  0.181   0.111  0.162   0.194
T2   -0.142   -0.173  -0.199   -0.135  -0.180   -0.205
Bt+1    0.011    0.018  0.018   0.024  0.018   0.011
               
               
Initial values: Kt = .06; Bt = 0 
  
 
Table 2.  Optimal Policy Rules 
(r* = 1) 
 
Unconstrained 
                    
ρ    0.9    0.9  0.9   0.1  0.1   0.1
β    0.7    1.0  1.3   0.7  1.0   1.3
                    
V    -2.806    -3.294  -3.729   -2.987  -3.292   -3.555
C1    0.260    0.212  0.176   0.249  0.212   0.179
C2    0.363    0.418  0.458   0.347  0.418   0.474
Kt+1    0.165    0.158  0.153   0.192  0.158   0.135
T1    0.023    0.049  0.074   -0.017  0.049   0.109
T2    -0.048    -0.103  -0.143   -0.032  -0.103   -0.159
Bt+1    0.024    0.055  0.070   0.050  0.055   0.050
                    
                    
Constrained 
                    
ρ    0.9    0.9  0.9   0.1  0.1   0.1
β    0.7    1.0  1.3   0.7  1.0   1.3
                    
V    -2.821    -3.301  -3.758   -2.991  -3.300   -3.572
C1    0.253    0.200  0.159   0.235  0.196   0.172
C2    0.362    0.406  0.444   0.349  0.406   0.450
Kt+1    0.173    0.182  0.184   0.204  0.185   0.166
T1   0.035   0.073  0.111   0.010  0.080   0.124
T2   -0.047   -0.091  -0.129   -0.034  -0.091   -0.135
Bt+1    0.011    0.018  0.018   0.024  0.011   0.011
               
               




Table 3.  The Impact of Risk Aversion 




range   0.1   0.1   0.1   1.1   1.1    1.1
γ   1.1   3.0   5.0   1.1   3.0    5.0
                    
V   -22.73   -15.04   -126.42   -22.74   -15.65    -136.95
C1   0.132   0.200   0.218   0.132   0.197    0.211
C2   0.356   0.286   0.271   0.353   0.286    0.266
Kt+1   0.067   0.069   0.066   0.070   0.072    0.078
T1   0.120   0.075   0.063   0.120   0.079    0.073
T2   -0.172   -0.102   -0.087   -0.169   -0.102    -0.082
Bt+1   0.052   0.027   0.024   0.050   0.023    0.009
                    
                    




Table 4.  Changing Uncertainty: ARCH Model 




range   Constant  Range    ARCH(1) 
γ   1.1   3.0   5.0   1.1   3.0    5.0
                    
V   -22.74   -15.65   -136.95   -22.73   -15.31    -123.62
C1   0.132   0.197   0.211   0.131   0.200    0.223
C2   0.353   0.286   0.266   0.351   0.286    0.278
Kt+1   0.070   0.072   0.078   0.074   0.069    0.054
T1   0.120   0.079   0.073   0.123   0.071    0.046
T2   -0.169   -0.102   -0.082   -0.167   -0.103    -0.095
Bt+1   0.050   0.023   0.009   0.044   0.032    0.048
                    
                    
Initial values: Kt = .06; Bt = 0; ARCH parameters: α = 0.2, m = 0.1 
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